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Insurance companies are becoming more involved in product markets that are traditionally linked to the 
banking sector. The increasingly intertwined banking and insurance sectors have prompted calls for 
stronger regulatory oversight of the insurance industry. While banks are consistently considered the 
most systemically risky, this paper finds that insurance firms also display substantial systemic risk 
through their connection with the broader financial sector and the real economy. 
The current regulatory environment is significantly different to what was in place before the global financial 
crisis (GFC). There has been an increase in the macro-prudential regulatory policy focus on the stability of 
the financial system and its impact on the real economy. While deposit-taking institutions were previously 
the focus of regulatory attention, insurance companies are now also attracting greater macro-prudential 
oversight.  
Although the policy response to the GFC has varied by jurisdiction, in the US, the Dodd Frank Act provides 
for close oversight of non-bank financial companies only once they have been designated ‘too big to fail’. 
This may be because traditional insurance companies have a steady flow of income, with only occasional 
large calls on their capital in the case of a catastrophic event. This differs from the banking sector, where 
there is the ever-present potential for bank runs. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether firms engaged in the insurance sector contribute to 
systemic risk. The paper specifically addresses the measurement of systemic risk in this sector of the US 
economy. It examines the linkages between the insurance and banking sectors, as well as their ties to firms 
in the real economy.  
The research has produced a dynamic index of systemic risk that applies at several different levels. The 
index covers the overall financial sector, and may be further refined to focus on the banking and insurance 
sectors, and on the individual companies within these sectors. The universe of stock samples is the S&P 500 
Index, and the analysis period extends from 2003 to 2011. 
The paper makes four important contributions:  
First, the profile of systemic risk for the insurance sector differs from that of the banking sector during the 
period leading up to the GFC.   
Second, the different profile of insurance companies reflects their unique balance sheet structure and 
investment behaviour during the sample period. While research has shown that core insurance products 
provide little evidence of increased risk, many insurers now provide a wide range of financial services.  
Changes to regulatory laws governing insurers may also have induced them to participate in the shadow 
insurance sector.  
 
 
 
 
Third, the intertwining product markets of the insurance and banking sectors contribute to their systemic 
risk profiles. Since the repeal of the Glass-Stegall Act, insurers have offered a wider product range. During 
the period from 2006 to late 2010, when US housing prices declined sharply, banks were reducing their 
exposure to collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), while the insurance sector was increasing its exposure. 
Insurers and deposit-takers are now active to varying degrees in both credit and risk transformation. This 
paper finds that an increase in the use of credit risk transfer products contributes to a higher level of 
systemic risk in both the banking and insurance sectors.  
Fourth, this research contributes to the debate over whether insurers are systemically as risky as banks. 
Insurance companies have argued that applying banking style regulation to insurance companies is 
unwarranted. However, this research finds that while the most systemically risky financial firms are banks, 
they are closely followed by insurance companies - who outrank many other financial institutions in terms 
of their vulnerability to systemic risk. 
While the US has retained a notably different approach to regulation, the international regulatory trend is 
to identify potentially systemically important insurers. This paper considers the widely debated question of 
whether the insurance sector should indeed be of macro-prudential regulatory concern.  
The research concludes by providing evidence that, although the banking sector is consistently the most 
systemically risky, there is a distinct cluster of insurance firms that follow. This validates the claim that the 
insurance sector does play a role in the transmission of systemic risk. Although insurance products 
themselves are not vehicles for triggering a financial crisis, the intertwining of this sector and the banking 
sector, and the involvement of each in products that support credit creation, means that the insurance 
sector warrants closer regulatory attention. 
 
